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Environmental Law
by Edward A. Kazmarek*
and
W. Scott Laseter**

I. INTRODUCTION

Environmental law as a separate discipline has continued to grow in
stature during the last few years and the rising influence of environmental factors in all areas of law and business shows no signs of abating. With
President Clinton's appointment of Carol Browner, former Florida Department of Environmental Regulation Secretary, as Administrator of the
United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), the new administration signaled its intent to place greater emphasis on environmental issues. Even Vice President Gore's popular book, Earth In The Balance, advocates wide ranging and fundamental changes in American
society and revolves around a particular environmental vision.
Like its predecessor, this survey provides a single compilation of the
significant case law on environmental issues in the Eleventh Circuit. During the survey period, courts in the Eleventh Circuit focused most of their
attention on the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act,' the chief federal statute addressing contaminated
land. However, for the sake of consistency and usefulness, this Article will
follow the format of the previous survey2 addressing the issues in the order of environmental procedure, water protection, land related cases, and,
finally, criminal enforcement.
* Partner in the firm of Long, Aldridge & Norman, Atlanta, Georgia. University of California at Los Angeles (B.A., 1975); University of Southern California (J.D., 1983). Law Re-

view, Editor in Chief (1982-1983).
** Associate in the firm of Long, Aldridge & Norman, Atlanta, Georgia. University of the

South (B. A., 1984); Mercer University (J.D., magna cumlaude, 1990). Member, Mercer Law
Review (1988-1990).
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
2. Edward A. Kazmarek & W. Scott Laseter, Environmental Law, 42 MERCEa L. Rv.
1411 (1991).
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ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURE

A. Background and Statutory Scheme
In passing the National Environmental Protection Act ("NEPA"),3 the

primary statute governing environmental procedure, Congress sought to
ensure that important environmental consequences of the federal government's actions would not "be overlooked or underestimated only to be
discovered after resources have been committed or the die otherwise
cast."4 NEPA requires federal agencies to follow procedures that insure
environmental issues are fully considered whenever a proposed project
would be a "major [flederal action."' Initially, an agency must prepare an
environmental assessment ("EA") if it determines the proposal is a major
federal action. If the assessment shows no "significant effect on the
human environment," then the agency may issue a finding of no significant impact ("FONSI").7 If the initial assessment indicates a likelihood
that the project will have significant impacts, the agency must prepare a
far more detailed environmental impact statement ("EIS"). s
B.

Curing Defective Procedure

During the survey period, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida considered whether subsequent studies performed after an agency issues a clearly inadequate EA can cure previously
defective procedure. In Protect Key West, Inc. v. Cheney,' the court held
that, at least when an agency makes the decision to commit to performing
a major fderal action prior to conducting the appropriate initial studies,
subsequent environmental investigations do not satisfy the mandates of
NEPA.10
Protect Key West concerned the Navy's attempt to construct a 160
unit housing development for military personnel on property adjoining
the city of Key West's historic district. After concluding the project
would constitute a major federal action, the Navy issued an eleven page
EA (three pages of which were area maps) that merely listed certain areas
of environmental effect and concluded the project would have no significant impact on any of the identified concerns. As a result of this EA, the
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988).
4. North Buckhead Civic Ass'n v. Skinner, 903 F.2d 1533, 1539-40 (11th Cir. 1990)
(quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989)).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988).

6. Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R.
7. Id. § 1508.13.
8. Id. § 1502.
9.

795 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1992).

10. Id. at 1560-62.

1501.3 (1991).
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Navy issued a FONSI and proceeded with the project. Plaintiff citizens
group sought and received a temporary restraining order and then requested a permanent injunction pending a full EIS."
First holding that the EA failed to meet the requirements of NEPA,
the court explained:
[T]he Navy prudently does not attempt to defend this action soley on
the adequacy of the EA. Indeed, the Mayor of Key West, as amicus curiae testifying in favor of the construction of military housing on the site,
'noted: "[i]f all the Court had to look at was the original Environmental
Assessment from 1988, the Court would have to find that the decision to
reconstruct the military housing at [the site] was arbitrary and
capricious.""
However, despite the court's initial holding on the inadequacy of the
EA, the Navy argued that additional studies, surveys and investigations
conducted after it made the decision to proceed with the development
cured any defects in the original EA. Those additional studies, the Navy
contended, satisfied the requirements for preparation of an EA and supported the 1988 FONSI. 3
Describing the Navy's approach as "Commit First, Ask Questions
Later,"" the court held, "[iln the NEPA context, post hoc compliance by
definition does not accord with the Congressional mandate."' 5 The court
differentiated this case from decisions in other circuits allowing subsequent investigations to amend an otherwise inadequate EIS because the
defect in the Navy's procedure occurred at the first step of the process.
The court stated that, "[tlhe case for remand is certainly stronger where
an agency has foreclosed NEPA considerations from its decision making
early on in the process." 6
C. Remedies for Breaches of Environmental Procedure
Although the court in Protect Key West held that the Navy's efforts to
cure its defective procedure had failed, it was still confronted with the
question of an appropriate remedy. 17 Ironically, both plaintiff and defendant asked the court to make a substantive decision regarding whether
the proposed project would cause significant impacts on the environment.
The Navy hoped the court would look at its post-EA studies and con11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1554.
at 1560.
at
at
at
at

1561.
1562.
1562 n.4.
1562.
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clude that its finding of no significant impact was correct. Plaintiff argued
that the court should determine from the evidence it submitted during
trial that the project would indeed cause significant impacts and that the
court should order the Navy to produce an EIS. 1' The court rejected both
positions, however, explaining:
Both parties now urge the court to determine from this conflicting evidence whether the Peary Court project will have a significant impact on
the environment, much as the agency properly should have done in the
first instance.
This determination, however, is appropriately made by the agency and
not the court. The court's proper function at this point is not to make
this substantive determination, but rather to insure that the agency reasonably took account of all of the environmental consequences of its action before making the decision to proceed. The court made the limited
finding here that based on plaintiff's evidence adduced in these proceedings, the agency at the time the EA was filed, failed reasonably to consider the environmental consequences of its decision to proceed as required by NEPA. Therefore, a remand to the agency for further
proceedings consistent with NEPA and this opinion is appropriate."'
The court's holding in Protect Key West states an important lesson for
both potential NEPA plaintiffs and government agencies. The case suggests to agencies that, at least in the eyes of the federal judiciary, NEPA
is not a mere formality along the road to business as usual. For plaintiffs,
the case illustrates that, although NEPA is a powerful tool compelling
agencies to consider the consequences of their actions, it offers no substantive protection even from devasting environmental projects.2 0

III. PROTECTION OF WATER RESOURCES
A.

Wetlands

Background and Regulatory Scheme. The federal wetlands protection program is authorized under two principal statutes. First, permits
under Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act
("RHAA")21 govern the placement of structures in the "navigable waters
of the United States.' 2 Second, Section 404 of the Clean Water Act
("CWA") 3 authorizes permits regulating the placement of dredge or fill
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 1563.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
See, e.g., 903 F. 2d at 1533. See Kazmarek & Laseter, supra note 2, at 1412.
33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467 (1988).

22. 33 U.S.C. § 403; see also 33 C.F.R. § 322.1 (1992).
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).
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material into a broader class of water defined as "waters of the United
States. '2 4 The definition of "waters of the United States" begins with the
"navigable -waters of the United States" and then adds virtually any connected water system such as a remote tributary or "adjacent wetland." 2'
Section 10 and section 404 permits frequently overlap because of the
types of waters regulated and because the "fill" substances covered under
section 404 permits include many raw building materials, such as concrete
or gravel, necessary for the structures contemplated under section 10 perStates Army Corp of Engineers ("Corps")
mits. Consequently, the United
26
administers both programs.
Definition of "Navigable Water of the United States." As a
precondition to the Corps' exercise of authority under Section 10, the affected water must be classified as "navigable waters of the United
States." The Eleventh Circuit considered the definition of "navigable waters of the United States" in United States v.Harrell.27 In Harrell commercial fisherman tried to gain access to a tributary of the Tombigbee
River in southern Alabama by arguing that the tributary was subject to
the federal government's navigational servitude28 and, therefore, open to
public access. Defendants were riparian owners along the tributary. After
the trial court determined that the tributary was a non-navigable
stream,2 plaintiffs sought an evaluation of the waters by the Corps which
determined that the tributary was "below the ordinary high water mark"
30
and, therefore, within the "navigable waters of the United States.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit looked to the Corps' section 10 regulations that define the extent of the navigable waters of the United States
as including "the entire surface and bed of a navigable waterbody, which
includes all the land and waters below the ordinary high water mark." s
All the parties agreed that the Tombigbee itself was a navigable water
and, therefore, public property. 2 The Corps argued that its navigational
servitude should extend from the channel of the Tombigbee to "the en24. Id. § 1344; see also 33 C.F.R.
25. 33 C.F.R. § 328.1-328.3.
26. See id. §§ 320.1-320.4.

§ 328.3 (1992).

27. 926 F.2d 1036 (11th Cir. 1991).
28. For a definition of the federal government's navigational servitude, see Utah v.
United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); see also United States v. Rand, 389 U.S. 121, 123
(1967).
29. 926 F.2d at 1038.
30. Id.
31. 33 C.F.R. § 329.11(a).
32. As one federal court of appeals recently stated: "the nation's navigable waters have
always been considered 'public property.'" Owen v. United States, 851 F.2d 1404, 1408
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1864)).
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tire area covered by the ordinary high waters of the stream, including
tributaries that might not otherwise be considered navigable and areas
adjacent to the low water channel that revert to a swampy or even a dry
condition as the waters recede. ' ' 8 However, the court refused to take such
an expansive view, holding that under the Corps' own regulations,8 4 the
navigable servitude was limited to the "ordinary high water mark.
The Corps defines the "ordinary high water mark" of non-tidal waters
as:
the line on the shore established by the fluctuations of water and indicated by physical characteristics such as a clear, natural line impressed

on the bank; shelving; changes in the character of soil; destruction of
terrestrial vegetation; the presence of litter and debris; or other appropriate means that consider the characteristics of the surrounding areas.3
Reading this definition, the court held that "the ordinary high water
mark of non-tidal rivers is not the elevation reached by flood waters;
rather, it is 'the line to which high water ordinarilyreaches.'

"861

With this

legal definition of the "navigable waters of the United States" in hand,
the court deferred to the trial court's findings that indicated the area in
question was not ordinarily under water:
The district court found that the Tombigbee floods and their duration
and extent "are unpredictable except that they generally occur, if they
do at all, during the winter, or wet months, December through March."
These floods may last as briefly as a few days before receding and returning to within the banks and bed of the Tombigbee. When flooding
occurs, "the Tombigbee flood waters back up through these adjacent
riverbottom lands, and depending on their volume and duration, can
flood the area around Lewis Creek, approximately three miles from the
banks of the Tombigbee." Navigation on Lewis Creek during this flooding, even by small outboard motor boats, however, is not possible more
than 25% of any year and, even then, is temporary and unpredictable.
Moreover, the court noted that "the evidence is uncontroverted that the
waters of the Tombigbee River have not occupied the lowland bottomland area abutting Lewis Creek long enough to destroy all terrestrial
plant life and render the land valueless for agricultural purposes." The
riverbottom of Lewis Creek "is covered with grasses, trees and other terrestrial vegetation." The land in the immediately surrounding area is
used for raising cattle and hogs, for harvesting timber, and for hunting.8 7

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

926 F.2d at 1043.
Id. at 1041.
33 C.F.R. § 329.11(a)(1).
926 F.2d at 1042 (quoting in part State v. Sorenson, 271 N.W. 234, 326 (Iowa 1937)).
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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The Corps' authority to regulate structures was not directly at stake in
Harrell. Nonetheless, even though a section 10 permit was not at issue,
the court's definition of "navigable waters of the United States" should
control the Corps' section 10 jurisdiction. As the court noted, however,
the federal government still retains broad regulatory power over these
more remote waters under the section 404 permitting program. 8

Review of Corps Determinations.

In Banks v. Page,"' the United

States District Court for the Southern District of Florida considered
whether the recipient of a cease and desist order from the Corps may seek
judicial review of that order prior to any enforcement action by the
Corps. The case involved a long history of dealings between the Corps
and plaintiff. Plaintiff had filled land in Monroe County, Florida, during
the early 1980s. The Corps discovered the discharges and determined that
the property was within the "waters of the United States."4 0 Consequently, the Corps issued a cease and desist order directing plaintiff to
stop the discharges and further requiring plaintiff to apply for an afterthe-fact permit.41 Plaintiff filed for the after-the-fact permit, but the
Corps subsequently denied that request. No further activity occurred at
that time.
In early 1990, the Corps discovered that plaintiff had made additional
discharges onto the property. The agency then issued a second series of
cease and desist orders. In response, plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the subject property was not within the Corps' jurisdictional
waters under the CWA. The Corps moved to dismiss, arguing that the
CWA precluded judicial review prior to enforcement actions by the
Corps.

4

2

In holding that the CWA does not allow pre-enforcement review of
cease and desist orders, the court noted a split among the federal circuits
that have decided the issue. 43 In the Fourth Circuit case of Southern
Pines Ass'n v. United States,4' plaintiff challenged an EPA compliance
order issued under the CWA, claiming that the EPA lacked jurisdiction
over the site. Following the majority view, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
trial court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' The Fourth
Circuit emphasized that the CWA enforcement scheme expressly author38.

Id. at 1043.

39.

768 F. Supp. 809 (S.D. Fla. 1991), rev'd and vacated in part, 963 F.2d 385 (11th Cir.

1992).
40. 768 F. Supp. at 810-11.

41.

Id. at 810.

42.

Id. at 811.

43.
44.
45.

Id. at 811-13.
912 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 717.
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ized judicial review of orders issued by the EPA assessing administrative
penalties as well as civil enforcement actions.4 0 In contrast, the CWA provided no such express authorization of judicial review of compliance orders. Therefore, the court considered the absence of such an express provision "clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended to exclude
this type of action.' 7 On the other hand, in a Ninth Circuit case, Swanson v. United States,'4 the court allowed pre-enforcement review of a
Corps cease and desist order under section 404 of the CWA because it
found there was no administrative procedure to challenge the Corps'
jurisdiction.'
The court in Banks agreed with the majority view announced in Southern Pines, holding that the CWA precluded judicial review of cease and
desist orders until the Corps actually brings an enforcement action. 0
Therefore, a recipient of a Corps cease and desist order must choose between alternative courses of conduct. If confident that the property is
outside the jurisdictional waters, the person may proceed with the proposed activity in spite of the order, thereby inviting the Corps to initiate
enforcement action. If seeking a more secure route, that person must apply to the Corps for a permit to continue the questioned activity. If the
Corps denies that permit, the applicant may then contest that denial
under the CWA.
B. National Pollution DischargeElimination System
Background and Statutory Scheme. The CWA's National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") program governs the dis46. Id. at 715.
47. Id. See Hoffman Group, Inc. v. EPA, 902 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1990).
48. 600 F. Supp. 802 (D. Idaho 1985), af/d, 789 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1986).
49. 789 F.2d at 1372.
50. The court also addressed whether plaintiff might still be entitled to declaratory relief
under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988). In rejecting
this claim, the court cited an earlier Eleventh Circuit decision, Avella v. United States Army
Corps of Eng'rs, No. Civ. 89-10064, 1990 WL 84499 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd per curiam, 916 F.2d
721 (11th Cir. 1990). In Avella plaintiff sought confirmation that its proposed activity would
fall within a nationwide permit under the CWA. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial
court's decision that the EPA's denial of plaintiff's request did not constitute final agency
action under the APA. The court emphasized that the Corps action had no binding legal
effect on plaintiff, but merely advised him of the Corps' position. After receiving the Corps'
response, plaintiff could continue the activity if he was sure of his position, or initiate an
individual permit action. If he followed the latter course and was denied a permit, he would
then have standing to contest that denial. The court in Banks found that a cease and desist
order, like a pronouncement of whether an activity falls within a national permit, does not
alter rights or obligations but merely advises the regulated community about the Corps position. Thus, a cease and desist order is not a final agency action under the APA. 768 F.
Supp at 814.
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charge of pollutants into the nation's waters."1 This program regulates
"point source" discharges of pollutants into the "waters of the United
States."' 2 Under the NPDES program's basic regulatory scheme, a discharger must obtain a permit from the EPA unless the state in which the
discharge occurs has its own program approved by the EPA."' If the state
has an approved program, then it becomes the implementing agency subject to the EPA's authority to approve or disapprove specific state issued
permits."
Citizens Suits. Like most other major environmental statutes, the
CWA contains a citizens suit provision allowing private attorneys general
to bring suits that would otherwise be in the sole province of government
agencies.5s In National Environmental Foundation v. ABC Rail Corp.,"
the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the requirement that citizens
sixty days notice prior to commencing a
groups give potential defendants
7
lawsuit was mandatory.
That case concerned the National Environmental Foundation's
("NEF") contention that the ABC Rail Corporation was violating sections
301 and 3071" of the CWA as well as the requirements of its NPDES permit by discharging pollutants, including copper, lead and zinc, into Alabama's Buxahatchee Creek. The NEF filed suit the day after it gave notice to ABC Rail, the Alabama Department of Environmental
Management and the EPA under section 505 of the Act." Section 505
provides in relevant part:
No action may be commenced(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the
alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).
52. Id. § 1362(14). Historically, NPDES permits principally have targeted industrial and
municipal discharges of waste water, although portions of the statute that have recently
gone into effect broaden the program to cover many previously unregulated discharges of
storm water. See id. § 1342(p). While no storm water cases have yet to be reported from
Eleventh Circuit courts, this area is likely to warrant substantial coverage in future survey
articles.

53, Id. § 1362.
54. Alabama and Georgia have approved NPDES programs, while Region IV of the EPA
administers the NPDES program in Florida.
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988); see also Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988); Kazmarek & Laseter, supra note
2, at 1426 (discussing citizens suit cases under the Clean Water Act).

56.

926 F.2d 1096 (11th Cir. 1991).

57.
58.

Id. at 1097; 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1988).
33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1317 (1988).

59. Id. § 1365.
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which the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, limitation, or order, . .. except that such
action may be brought immediately after such notification in
the case of an action under this section respecting 'a violation of
sections 1316 and 1317(a) of this title .... 0
Examining this language, the court held that the express terms of section 505 make the notice requirement mandatory. 61 However, the NEF
argued that section 505 also provides an express exception to the sixty
day notice requirement for suits brought under section 307(a). Section
307(a) requires the EPA to promulgate effluent limitations for toxic pollutants.62 In turn, section 307(d) prohibits the owner or operator of any
point source from violating the limitations promulgated under section
307(a).63
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the NEF's argument holding that the
provisions of section 307(a) are directed solely at the EPA." In contrast
the court determined that the NEF's claims were against a private party
and, therefore, came under section 307(d)." As a result, the appellate
court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the NEF complaint."
IV.
A.

CERCLA

Background and Statutory Scheme

. Perhaps no statute better epitomizes the force of modern environmental law than the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act ("CERCLA").07. Sometimes called Superfund in reference to the trust fund Congress established to finance some of the EPA's
activities under the Act, CERCLA grants broad powers to the Agency,
allowing it to respond to actual or threatened releases of hazardous substances and then recover the costs of clean-up from other responsible parties."8 Also, CERCLA allows private parties to bring both direct actions
against other responsible parties to recover response costs and contribution claims if the private party is ordered to perform a clean-up by the
government.9 During the previous survey period the Eleventh Circuit
60. Id.
61. 926 F.2d at 1097-98.
62.

33 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (1988).

63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. § 1317(d).
926 F.2d at 1099.
Id.
Id.

67. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
68. Id. § 9604(a)(1).

69. Id. § 9659.
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demonstrated its willingness to take a very aggressive stance on cases
arising under CERCLA.10 In some instances, the court may have gone farther than even the EPA wanted. For example, in United States v. Fleet
Factors Corp.,"1 the court suggested in dicta that a lender could be liable
for response costs under CERCLA based on the mere inference that it
was in a position to influence the borrower's environmental practices.7
This case prompted the EPA to issue its "lender liability rule" that details the kinds of activities lenders can safely pursue with their borrowers
without losing CERCLA's "secured creditor" exemption. 3 At least in
comparison to some of the more draconian readings of the potential impact of Fleet Factors, the EPA's lender liability rule gives secured creditors much greater7 latitude in their lending practices than the Eleventh
Circuit's opinion. '

B. CERCLA Enforcement Power
One of the Act's enforcement mechanisms, section 106 of CERCLA,
gives the EPA the power to order private parties to perform clean-ups of
hazardous substances that pose an "imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment ... ." Under
section 107, the EPA can collect treble damages from any person otherwise liable under the Act that fails to properly carry out such an order .7
This provision places a respondent in a difficult position. Although the
statute does allow a person not to respond to an order for "sufficient
cause," a 7 respondent risks treble damages to find out if his cause is
sufficient.'

The treble damages provision was the subject of the only case directly
under CERCLA to reach the appellate court during the survey period.
United States v. Parsons" concerned the refusal of several individual defendants to carry out an EPA order to remove drums of hazardous wastes
from a farm used as a disposal site. The trial court granted the EPA's
70. See Kazmarek & Laseter, supra note 2, at 1435.
71. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).

72. 901 F.2d at 1558.
73. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,382 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300.110).
74. The Rule allows lenders to engage in a broad range of activity so long as these activities "are primarily to protect a security interest." Id. at 18,383. Allowed activities include
requiring environmental assessments or even remediation prior to closing the loan, assessments or clean-ups after the loan is made, pre-foreclosure workouts, and even foreclosure.
Even after foreclosure, the lender will only become liable if its primary purpose changes
from protection of the collateral to managing the property for investment. Id.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 9606a (1988).
76. Id. § 9607(c)(3).

77. Id.
78. 936 F.2d 526 (11th Cir. 1991).
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request for punitive damages but limited the amount to a total of three
times the cost of the clean-up. 7s In vacating the district court's order, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that the statute was unclear on whether treble
damages should be the total sum recovered or an amount in addition to
the actual cost of clean-up.' 0 Consequently the court held:
[A]s the second circuit noted with respect to CERCLA, we are unwilling
to interpret the statute "in any way that apparently frustrates the statute's goals, in the absence of a specific congressional intention otherwise." We accordingly believe that the section should be interpreted to
allow the government to recover up to a total of four times the amount it
expended in cleaning up the hazardous wastes.' 1
C. Persons Liable Under CERCLA
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida decided what may prove to be a very important case regarding the activities
sufficient to trigger "operator" liability under CERCLA in Jacksonville
Electric Authority v. Eppinger & Russell Co. 82 Although often perceived

as ensnaring virtually anyone remotely connected to a contaminated facility, CERCLA actually only creates potential liability in four specific classes of parties: (1) the current owner and operator of the facility; (2) the
owner or operator of the facility at the time of disposal of hazardous substances; (3) the persons who arranged for the treatment, transport or disposal of hazardous substances; and (4) the persons who accept hazardous
3
substances for treatment, transport or disposal.'
In Jacksonville Electric Authority, the district court considered
whether the current owner of the site. of a wood creosoting plant could
hold the trustees of Tufts College ("Tufts") liable as either the owner or
79. 738 F.. Supp. 1436, 1439 (N.D. Ga. 1990). For a discussion of the trial court's decision, see Kazmarek & Laseter, supra note 2,'at 1445.
80. 936 F.2d at 527-28.
81. Id. at 528-29 (footnotes omitted).
82. 776 F. Supp. 1542 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988). Specifically, the Act provides liability for:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,(2) any person who at the time
of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which
such hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who by contract,
agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a
transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned
or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances, and (4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substance for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person ....
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operator of the facility at the time of disposal of hazardous substances.
From 1925 to 1942, Tufts owned the majority of the stock of the corporation that directly owned and operated the plant and it exercised certain
supervisory functions frequently associated with majority ownership of a
corporation." The court initially separated the issues of "owner" liability
from "operator liability."85 By rejecting plaintiff's claim that a majority
stockholder of a corporation that directly holds title to a contaminated
facility is an owner of the facility under CERCLA in the absence of factors that might justify piercing the corporate veil, the court followed the
clear majority of other courts that have addressed the question." The
court held:
In order to hold Defendant liable as an owner of the facility, the facts
must justify piercing the corporate veil. The corporate veil should be
pierced to impose liability on the parent for the subsidiary's acts when
the subsidiary is used as a sham to avoid direct liability. Factors to be
considered in determining whether the corporate veil should be pierced
to reach a parent corporation are: (1) The parent and the subsidiary have
common stock ownership; (2) The paient and the subsidiary have common directors or officers; (3) The parent and the subsidiary have common business departments; (4) The parent and subsidiary file consolidated financial statements and tax returns; (5) The parent finances the
subsidiary; (6) The parent caused the incorporation of the subsidiary; (7)
The subsidiary operates with grossly inadequate capital; (8) The parent
pays the salaries and other expenses of the subsidiary; (9) The subsidiary
receives no business except that given to it by the parent; (10) The parent uses the subsidiary's property as its own; (11) The daily operations of
the two corporations are not kept separate; and (12) The subsidiary does
not observe the basic corporation formalities, such as keeping separate
books and records and holding shareholder and board meetings.8 "
Finding that the facts before it did not justify piercing the corporate
veil, the court held Tufts could not be a PRP as the owner of the facility
at the time of disposal of hazardous substances. 8 The court then turned
to plaintiff's contention that, even if Tufts was not the owner of the facility under CERCLA, it nonetheless exercised sufficient influence over the
actual owner to be an operator under the Statute.8 ' The court first noted
84. 776 F. Supp. at 1544.
85. Id. at 1545-46.
86. See, e.g., Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. TL James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989). But see Idaho v, Bunker Hill Co.,
635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986) (suggesting ability to control subsidiary is key to liability
either as an owner or operator).
87. 776 F. Supp. at 1545 (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 1546.
89. Id.
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that no other court in the Eleventh Circuit appeared to have directly considered the issue of operator liability, although the court in Fleet Factors
did discuss the question in dicta.90 Therefore, it turned to cases from the
First and Fifth Circuits for guidance on when a parent company should
be deemed an operator.
In a recent decision, Riverside Market Development Corp. v. International Building Products,Inc.,O the Fifth Circuit refused to impose operator liability on the former majority stockholder of a corporation that
owned an asbestos manufacturing facility.2 In. crafting what is probably
the most limited definition of "operator" under CERCLA handed down
by any court, the Fifth Circuit stated that parties are only liable as operators if "they themselves actually participate in the wrongful conduct prohibited by the Act."9" The court found the majority stockholder spent
very little time at the facility and that his visits to' the facility afforded
him little opportunity to direct or personally participate in the improper
disposal of asbestos or asbestos by-products.9 , Therefore, the appellate
court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the majority stockholder on
the issue of operator liability.9 5
The First Circuit created a somewhat broader test in United States v.
Kayser-Roth Corp. 6 In that case, the parent corporation "exerted practical total influence" over the subsidiary's day to day activities.97 Specifically, the court found that Kayser-Roth (1) exercised total monetary control over the subsidiary, including collecting accounts payable and
restricting the subsidiary's budget, (2) directed that subsidiary-governmental contact be funneled directly through Kayser-Roth, (3) required
pre-approval by Kayser-Roth of any capital transfer or expenditures exceeding $5,000 and of any real estate transactions by the subsidiary, and
(4) placed Kayser-Roth personnel in most of the subsidiary's director and
officer positions.8 In addition, the court found that Kayser-Roth had the
authority "to control the release or threat of release of pollution at the
site and the ability to prevent and abate damage from the release."'99
Responding to these facts, the First Circuit stated "[tlo be an operator
requires more than merely complete ownership and the concomitant gen90.

901 F.2d at 1559-60.

91.

931 F.2d. 327 (5th Cir. 1991).

92.

Id. at 330.

93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
Id.
910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990).

97. Id. at 27 (quoting United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D.R.I.
1989)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 27-28.
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eral authority or ability to control that comes with ownership. At a minimum it requires active involvement in the activities of the subsidiary."100
However, because of Kayser-Roth's "total influence and control over" the
subsidiary's day to day activities, the court held the parent corporation
liable as an operator. 101
After reviewing this precedent, the district court in Jacksonville Electric Authority stated:
Viewed together, Riverside, Kayser-Roth, and Fleet Factors impose operator liability on the parent corporation of a wholly-owned subsidiary
when the parent exercises actual and pervasive control of the subsidiary
to the extent of actually involving itself in the daily operations of the
subsidiary. Actual involvement in decisions regarding the disposal of hazardous substances is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition to the
imposition of operator liability.'0
Applying the law to the facts, the court explained:
Plaintiff cites the following actions as evidence that Tufts actively involved itself in Eppinger's affairs: (1) Tufts owned all or almost all the
stock in Eppinger; (2) Tufts dictated the terms of employment of Eppinger's President (Chadwick) and other executive officers; (3) Tufts' creation of a profit sharing plan for the Eppinger officers; (4) Eppinger's distribution of dividends in excess of net earnings during Tufts' period of
ownership, which allegedly contributed to a situation where the equipment at the wood preserving facility was not properly upgraded and replaced; (5) Tufts' receipt of reports at Trustee meetings on the status of
Eppinger's operations; (6) Tufts' alleged hiring of William Cook as Director, Vice-President, and General Manager of Eppinger; (7) Statements
by trustees to the effect that Tufts carried on a business at the Eppinger
facility; (8) During Tufts' period of ownership, the method of wood treatment was changed from the use of arsenic salt to the use of another unspecified chemical. These contacts do not, taken as a whole or individually, amount to "active involvement" by Tufts in the operations of
Eppinger beyond the general authority that derives from parent company status.10'
Like all cases, Jacksonville Electric Authority was not decided in a
vacuum. The court no doubt was influenced by the fact that Tufts was
not the usual defendant for a CERCLA suit. Indeed, in reference to its

factual findings that Tufts did not exercise day to day control, the court
said, "[ilt would be extremely odd if Tufts had taken such an [active]
100. Id. at 27.
101. Id. (quoting 724 F. Supp. at 18).
102. 776 F. Supp. at 1547-48.
103. Id. at 1548.
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approach, given the vast dissimilarities between operating an educational
institution and operating a creosoting plant."11 0 ' Possibly, the district
court's announced rule for operator liability, broader than the Fifth Circuit's approach but which is by no means the most aggressive position
among the various courts considering the issue,' 5 was tempered by the
comparatively sympathetic defendant in the case before it. In light of the
Eleventh Circuit's expansive view of CERCLA in cases like Fleet Factors
and Parsons,the Eleventh Circuit might choose to paint a broader definition of operator liability when given a less sympathetic defendant.
D. Citizens Suits
Like the CWA, CERCLA contains a "citizens suit" provision that allows private citizens to bring suits which would otherwise be within the
sole province of governmental enforcement.10 s Normally, the citizens suits
are used by private plaintiffs such as environmental organizations and
other interested groups as a supplemental enforcement mechanism to the
government's prosecutorial discretion. However, in Woodman v. United
States,0 7 a defendant in a section 107 cost recovery action tried to use a
provision in CERCLA's citizens suit provision that bars such suits after
the President has initiated an enforcement action as a shield against a
private plaintiff.108
That case concerned a lawsuit filed by residents of a neighborhood constructed near a former landfill used by the Navy to dispose of waste.10 9 In
addition to a variety of state law claims, plaintiff alleged he incurred response costs in the form of medical surveillance expenses and associated
costs in obtaining an alternative water supply. One of the defendants, a
104. Id.
105. At least two district court cases have suggested a lower standard for finding a parent corporation liable as an operator. In Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 18 Env't. L. Rep.
20, 578 (D. Col. 1987), the court stated:
Other factors to be considered in determining whether a parent corporation is an
"owner or operator" of a facility held by one of its subsidiaries include the percentage of the subsidiary's stock owned by the parent, whether and to what extent
the parent exercises authority to execute contracts on behalf of the subsidiary and
whether the parent controls the selection, supervision, transfer and similar aspects
of employment for those normally employed by the subsidiary.
Similarly, the court in Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 655, pointed to a parent's "capacity" to
control the subsidiary as a significant factor in finding liability. Both Idarado and Bunker
Hill relied on the definition of "owner-operator" under the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act in crafting the broad definition of "operator" under CERCLA.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1988).
107. 764 F. Supp. 1467 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
108. Id. at 1472; 42 U.S.C. § 9659(d)(2) (1988).
109. 764 F. Supp. 1455, 1457 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (earlier decision in same case).
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private waste hauler responsible for transporting the Navy's allegedly
hazardous waste to the site, responded that plaintiff's CERCLA cause of
action was barred because the EPA had initiated a lawsuit under section
106 to compel clean-up of the site.110
The relevant portion of the citizens suit provision, which is created by
section 310 of the Act, states that "[n]o action may be commenced under
[the citizen suit provision] if the President has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under this chapter . . . . " The court rejected plaintiff's contention that its medical surveillance costs were recoverable in a response action under section 107 because they were directed
only at plaintiff and not at the general public.118 However, all the parties
agreed that plaintiff's expenditures to obtain alternative water supply
were proper response costs."" Thus, plaintiff's suit was properly characterized as a cost recovery action under section 107, not a true citizens suit
under section 310.'4 The court further held that the liability provisions
of section 107 and the citizens suit provision of section 310 addressed separate issues. 115 The citizens suit provision was designed to "prod the executive branch into zealously enforcing hazardous waste laws." ' , The liability provisions of section 107 were intended to encourage private clean-ups
by providing a mechanism through which persons who bleaned up releases of hazardous substances could recover those costs from the parties
responsible for the contamination.' Therefore, the court held that plaintiff could maintain its section 107 cause of action even if the EPA had
previously initiated an enforcement action.
E.

The Petroleum Exclusion

As discussed earlier, although CERCLA casts a broad net of liability,
11 8
the Act contains some important exceptions to the scope of coverage.
Among its significant limitations, CERCLA only creates liability for releases or threatened releases of "hazardous substances."'1 9 While the statute's definition of hazardous substances incorporates a long list of materials, it specifically excludes "petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction'
110. 764 F. Supp. at 1470-71.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(d) (1988).
112. For an analysis of medical monitoring expenses as section 107 response cost, see
Coburn v. Sun Chemical Corp., 28 Env't. Rep. 1665 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
113. -764 F. Supp. at 1471.
114. Id. at 1471-72.
115. Id. at 1472.
116. Id. (quoting Regan v. Cherry Corp., 706 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D.R.I. 1989)).
117. Id.
118. See supra note 83.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988).

1204

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

thereof.'20 In Bunger v. Hartman,'2' the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida followed the majority of courts in holding
the so-called "petroleum exclusion" extends to hazardous contaminants
1 22
that result from releases of petroleum products.
Bunger concerned plaintiff's efforts to recover the costs of cleaning up
contamination at a bulk petroleum storage facility allegedly caused by
defendant's (plaintiff's predecessor in interest) operations.123 On defendant's motion to dismiss, the court cited cases from other jurisdictions in
holding that the petroleum exclusion applied. 124 The court stated:
A fair reading of Plaintiff's Complaint leads to the inescapable conclusion that the "hazardous substances" discovered on the site were derived
from the petroleum products which were stored and sold by Texaco and
Hartman. The pleading identifies no other viable sources of the pollutants and contaminants. Accordingly, Counts VIII through XIII should,
and by the same are, [sic] dismissed without prejudice. [The Plaintiffs
are granted leave to amend the complaint.] This pleading should give an
indication as to which hazardous substances were founa on the site,
whether they are inherent in petroleum, and if possible, their sources.12
F. Pleading and Practice
The court in Bunger also ruled that a complaint must allege four elements to state a cost recovery action under CERCLA 2" The complaint
must allege that (1) the site in question is a "facility""12 within the meaning of the statute, (2) there has been a release12 8 or threatened release of
hazardous substance from the facility, (3) the release or threatened release has caused the plaintiff to incur response costs that were necessary
and consistent with the "National Contingency Plan ("NCP"), 29 and (4)
the defendant falls within one of the four classes of parties subject to
120. Id. § 9601(14).
121. 797 F. Supp. 968 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
122. Id. at 972.
123. Id. at 970.
124. Id. at 972; see also Niecko v. Emro Mktg. Co., 769 F. Supp. 973 (E.D. Mich. 1991);
Wilshire Westwood Assocs. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Western Processing Co., 1761 F. Supp. 713 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
125. 797 F. Supp. at 972-73 (footnotes omitted).
126. Id. at 971.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988).
128. Id. § 9601(22).
129. Id. § 9605. The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
Plan ("NCP") is'a complex set of regulations that govern the methodologies for CERCLA
clean-ups. These regulations cover such broad topics as the preliminary site assessments and
investigation, the selection of short and long term remedies and the mechanisms for public
involvement in the clean-up process. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1-300.1105 (1992).

1993]

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

1205

liability."10 Although arguably unnecessary because of its application of
the petroleum exclusion, the court in Bunger.also found merit in the defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff failed to allege
131
that the claimed response costs were consistent with the NCP.
This facet of the 1992 decision in Bunger stands in apparent conflict to
a 1991 opinion from Judge Harold Murphy of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia. In Mathis v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.,"' Judge Murphy held on a motion for judgment on the pleadings that, while a plaintiff would have to show consistency with the NCP
for purposes of measuring damages, the movant did not need to show that
consistency with the NCP was undisputed to establish the non-movant's
liability."33 The court explained:
[Non-movants] have admitted that they were owners of the facility at
the time the hazardous material was transported there; that they are the
current owners of the facility; that the Marble Top Landfill is a facility

under CERCLA; that the EPA has determined that a release or
threatened release has occurred at the facility; and, that Velsicol has incurred "response costs." Instead of admitting that the response costs are
consistent with the National Contingency Plan, however, Plaintiffs have
stated that they do not know if the costs are consistent. Therefore, under
the Federal Rules their answer is considered as a denial regarding
whether the costs are consistent with the Plan. This denial, however,
does not affect whether Plaintiffs are liable parties under CERCLA, it
only affects what expenses Velsicol can collect in this private action
under CERCLA. Accordingly, because of these admissions, Plaintiffs are
liable parties under CERCLA unless they can establish one of the four
statutory defenses."
V.

ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES

During the survey period, the Eleventh Circuit heard another appeal of
a criminal conviction under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act's ("RCRA") prohibition on transporting hazardous waste to unpermitted landfills in United States v. Goldsmith.13 5 Affirming the conviction that resulted in a two year prison sentence, the court held that to
satisfy the "knowledge" requirement the government need only show that
the defendant knew the waste material was not a harmless substance such
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

797 F. Supp. at 971.
Id, at 973. See supra note 83.
786 F. Supp. 971 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
Id. at 973-74.
Id. at 974 (citations omitted).
978 F.2d 643 (11th Cir. 1992).
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as water, not that the defendant knew the waste was a specifically identified "hazardous waste."13 6
At issue in Goldsmith was the jury charge given by the district court.
RCRA makes it a crime to transport a "hazardous waste" to an unpermitted facility. However, the RCRA definition of hazardous waste only applies to very specific types of materials.1 8' Therefore, defendant requested
the following charge:
Before you can convict Mr. Goldsmith of either Count I or Count II, you
must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Goldsmith knew what the
substance in the barrels was, that the substance he believed was contained in the barrels was one defined as hazardous waste by the Environmental Protection Agency, and that Mr. Goldsmith knew that as to
Count I that he did not have a permit from E.P.A. to transport hazardous waste, and as to Count II, that Action Testing did not have a permit
to store hazardous waste."
However, the district court instead charged the jury that, before it
could convict the defendant, it must find in relevant part:
That the defendant knew that the stored material had the potential to
be harmful to others or to the environment, in other words, that it was
not an innocuous substance like water. I charge you that in deciding
whether the defendant had knowledge of the permit status at 1801 Montreal Court and 1804 Montreal Court, you are instructed that if you find
that the defendant willfully failed to determine the permit status of
these locations to which he moved the drums, then3 you may conclude
that the defendant acted knowingly in this regard.1 '
Upholding the conviction, the court said, "[iut is not necessary that the
government prove that defendant knew a chemical waste had been defined as a "hazardous waste" by the [EPA]. The Government need only
prove that a defendant 0had knowledge of "the general hazardous charac14

ter" of the chemical."

As mentioned in the introduction to this Article, the new Clinton administration is likely to place an even greater emphasis on environmental
matters than its predecessor. Due to the substantial leverage gained from
the deterrence effect, criminal enforcement activity probably will continue to rise in the coming years. In light of the near strict liability of
environmental crimes, vigilant compliance programs for business dealing
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 645.
978 F.2d at 644.
Id.
Id. at 645.
Id. (quoting United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745 (1990)).
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with potentially harmful materials or processes will become increasingly
critical for the ongoing viability of the enterprise.

